Voluntary disclosure of press releases and the importance of timing : a comparative study of the UK and Spain. by Guillamón-Saorín,  E. & Sousa,  C.M.P.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
15 May 2014
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Guillamon-Saorn, E. and Sousa, C.M.P. (2014) 'Voluntary disclosure of press releases and the importance of
timing : a comparative study of the UK and Spain.', Management international review., 54 (1). pp. 71-106.
Further information on publisher's website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11575-013-0194-z
Publisher's copyright statement:
The ﬁnal publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11575-013-0194-z.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
 1 
 
VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE OF PRESS RELEASES AND THE IMPORTANCE 
OF TIMING: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE UK AND SPAIN 
 
Encarna Guillamon-Saorin, University Carlos III Madrid, Spain 
Carlos M. P. Sousa,
 
Durham University, UK 
 
Management International Review 
Abstract: 
 This paper investigates the effect of proprietary costs in relation to managers’ decisions to 
disclose information. Further, we look into the impact of factors affecting the timing of 
disclosures in a comparative study of Spain and the UK. Our investigation focuses on 
management earnings press releases discussing annual results. These press releases allow 
managers great discretion in terms of the decision to release and the timing. 
 Our results show that the potential for growth is negatively related to the likelihood of a 
company voluntarily issuing a press release. Moreover, once the decision to voluntarily 
disclose is made, the timing is also relevant.  
 We find significant differences in the timing of press releases between the two countries 
examined in this study. Also, significant differences between companies having or not 
having an investor relations department are evident. The existence of an investor relations 
function in the company seems to have a different impact depending on the country. 
Interestingly, even though corporate performance seems not to have a direct effect on the 
timing of the press release, this factor is moderated by the country where companies 
operate.  
Keywords: voluntary disclosure, press releases, timing, investor relations department, Spain, UK 
Authors:  
Dr. Encarna Guillamon-Saorin, Department of Business Administration, University Carlos III de 
Madrid, C/ Madrid, 126, 28903 Getafe, Madrid, Spain; Tel: (+34) 916249642; Fax: (+34) 
916249607; Email: encarna.guillamon@uc3m.es.  
 
Professor Carlos M. P. Sousa, Durham University Business School, Durham University, Mill Hill 
Lane, Durham City, DH1 3LB, UK; Tel: (+44) 191 3340106; Fax: (+44) 191 3340595;  
Email: carlos.sousa@durham.ac.uk. 
 2 
 
 
VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE OF PRESS RELEASES AND THE IMPORTANCE 
OF TIMING: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE UK AND SPAIN 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The globalization of capital markets and the increase in foreign investors have brought pressure 
on companies to provide greater value to shareholders prompting standards setters to make 
changes in regulation toward harmonisation and international standards (Moden and Oxelheim 
1997; Strange, Filatotchev, Buck and Wright 2009). Differences in disclosure practices may 
jeopardise the harmonisation process because international investors may not be able to reliably 
compare information issued by companies in different countries (Alhashim 1982). To address 
these issues, we investigate whether proprietary information costs influence the decision to issue 
a press release and include a number of control factors which have been found to have an effect 
on the disclosure of press releases in prior literature (Guillamon-Saorin and Sousa 2010). 
Specifically, we investigate the circumstance in which managers have made the decision to issue 
a press release and concentrate on the determinants of timing and whether there are differences 
across the countries included in this study (Spain and the UK).  
Most firms have no formal policies for voluntary disclosure. Thus, the level of disclosure 
for a company is determined by its costs and benefits. Managers have discretion to decide on the 
nature, content, venue and timing of voluntary disclosure and the incentives they have to disclose 
or not will drive the final decision. Voluntary information points to different managerial attitudes 
related to this discretion. We examine growth opportunities as an indicator of proprietary 
information which has been widely used and accepted in prior literature (Bamber and Cheon 
1998; Clarkson, Kao and Richardson 1994). Growth opportunities are a sign of availability of 
profitable investments which are attractive for competitors or new investors. The possibility of 
growth opportunities may drive managers to withhold information to deter potential competitors 
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from entering the market. However, sometimes managers have no choice in relation to disclosure 
because no news could be interpreted as bad news (Francis, Nanda and Olsson 2008; Verrecchia 
1990). Once the decision to release has been made, managers have to decide on when to release 
the information. Management discretion related to timing may have high potential for strategic 
behaviour. For example, managers could decide to disclose the good news quickly and delay the 
bad news (Sengupta 2004).  
Timing is an important quality of financial information (Financial Accounting Standards 
Board 1980). The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has recently discussed the 
importance of timeliness, which was initially considered as part of relevance
1
 (IASB 2008). After 
further discussion and deliberation, the IASB concluded that information reported in a timely 
manner can positively affect relevance as well as the faithful representation of that information, 
and therefore needs to be considered as one of the enhancing qualitative characteristics of 
financial information that should be maximized to the extent possible (IASB 2008). In particular, 
the IASB states that timeliness means having information available to decision makers before it 
loses its capacity to influence decisions. Having relevant information available sooner can 
enhance its capacity to influence decisions, and a lack of timeliness can deprive information of its 
potential usefulness.  
Prior literature argues that timeliness is a key determinant in making the content of a 
document more effective in directing attention and that it is even capable of changing impressions 
(Daft and Lengel 1986). Therefore, an important factor to be considered by companies when 
deciding the date on which to voluntarily disclose information should be the potential benefits 
and costs of releasing quickly. Prior work investigates the timing of corporate disclosures using 
earnings announcements and earnings forecast errors to classify earnings announcements into 
good, bad or neutral news (e.g., Begley and Fischer 1998; Givoly and Palmon 1982; Kross 1981; 
Kross and Schroeder 1984). We investigate a particular type of earnings announcement, Annual 
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Results Press Releases (hereafter ARPRs), which are issued to the market soon after the accounts 
are closed. As a result, they usually reach their audience before the annual report is released, 
thereby providing stakeholders with a summary of the financial results of the company in a timely 
manner.  
In this study, we focus on Spanish and UK publicly traded companies and their decision 
to issue and the timing of ARPRs. Attempts related to timeliness regulation have been primarily 
confined to periodic reporting (e.g. interim or quarterly reports) in many countries. There are no 
explicit rules or guidance within the UK/Spanish Stock Exchange regulations regarding press 
releases because these are voluntary disclosures. However, there is a requirement (as specified in 
rules 9.1 and 9.2 of The Listing Rules of the London Stock Exchange in the UK and article 82 of 
the Law 24/1988 of 28 July of the Stock Exchange in Spain) that a company must inform a 
regulatory information service without delay of any price-sensitive information that is not public 
knowledge. Therefore, listed companies should not announce anything in a press release that may 
be considered price-sensitive unless it has already been announced via the regulatory news 
service.  
We investigate Spain and the UK because these contexts represent extreme examples of 
the two main accounting philosophies: the continental system, represented by Spain, which is 
characterized by debt-oriented companies, and the code law system and the Anglo-Saxon 
philosophy, which is market-oriented and characterized by common law (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 1997). In addition, Spain represents the less transparent and more 
conservative set of countries while the UK represents the more transparent and optimistic set 
(Gray 1988). The opposing characteristics of the UK and Spain provide a good context in which 
to test a number of new dimensions alongside previously tested variables.  
Thus, this study contributes to the literature in the following ways. Firstly, we add to the 
literature on voluntary disclosure by investigating documents (ARPRs) which have not been 
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widely explored in prior research
2
. The current paper presents evidence of the relevance of 
proprietary costs on the management decision to issue an ARPR.  
Secondly, our work adds to the current debate on the differences in disclosure practices 
among countries and the progress needed toward harmonization (e.g. Kolk 2005). In this context, 
there has been a vigorous debate as to whether and how a firm’s home-country legal system still 
plays a role in determining company disclosure strategies (Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki 2003; Shi, 
Magnan and Kim 2012). The growth in international transactions has obliged business to pay 
greater attention to international differences in information reporting and disclosure practices 
(Alhashim 1982; Shi et al. 2012). The internationalization of markets and the importance of 
international investment make studies comparing reporting practices in different countries 
relevant and valuable. Our hypotheses are tested in a cross-national context, using Spain and the 
UK. We demonstrate that country characteristics still matter in today s´ global business 
environment.  
Thirdly, we investigate whether firms facing higher agency costs provide more timely 
information. Agency theory underpins the need to reduce information asymmetries between 
managers and owners of publicly listed companies. In agency theory, information is considered a 
commodity which implies issuing costs. This gives special relevance to corporate information 
systems monitoring management behavior. A more efficient management monitoring can be 
achieved by the request of more information and more timely disclosures. Managers have the 
choice to delay or pre-empt the disclosure of ARPRs and this makes them an interesting venue 
through which to investigate the choice in timing. To our knowledge, this is the first study 
investigating the timing of this type of disclosure.  
In particular, we examine the effect of country, the existence of an investor relations 
department and corporate performance on timing of disclosure. Agency theory would suggest that 
these variables affect disclosure and transparency which is one of the main management 
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monitoring devices proposed by agency theory (Eisenhardt 1989). We further analyze the 
moderating effect of the national context in which these disclosures happen. The cross-variable 
effects of these variables in voluntary disclosure have not been previously analyzed. Lastly, the 
design of the study allows us to provide insights into the two decisions (i.e. the decision to 
issue/not issue, and the timing of the ARPR) jointly. This presents a more complete picture to 
better understand the management disclosure strategies. 
The next section of the paper provides the background for the institutional setting in 
Spain and the UK. Section three reviews the theoretical background and research hypotheses. 
Section four describes the method used to carry out the study. After presenting the results, and a 
discussion of their implications, the paper highlights the main conclusions and provides directions 
for further research.  
 
2. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING: SPAIN AND THE UK 
This study is framed in the international context by investigating cross-national differences in 
disclosure practices. Firms in different countries face variations in geography, climate, language, 
and culture, as well as institutional differences (Allred and Swan 2004; Strange et al. 2009). The 
literature defines two types of institutional constraints: (1) formal, such as laws, regulations, and 
state policies; and (2) informal, such as culture and social trust (Li, Fetscherin, Alon, Lattemann 
and Yeh 2010). Both constraints have been supported by empirical research and are considered 
valid arguments, but the informal one raises more controversy and criticism (Baskerville 2003).  
We use the elements of formal institutional constraints, which provide a more solid 
argument than the informal ones, to support our hypotheses on country differences in relation to 
disclosure practices. Factors such as the legal system, capital markets and economic development 
affect managers’ incentives and influence corporate reporting (Ball, Robin and Wu 2003) as well 
as disclosure levels (Hope 2003; Jaggi and Low 2000). Code-law countries (such as Spain) are 
 7 
 
considered to have a weak legal environment as they have lower quality law enforcement and 
investors have weaker legal rights than common-law countries (such as the UK) (La Porta et al. 
1997; 1998). Leuz et al. (2003), using cluster analysis, measure variables related to the 
institutional framework (e.g. outsider investor rights, legal enforcement, ownership concentration) 
and disclosure practices. Countries are grouped into three clusters. Countries in each cluster have 
similar institutional characteristics. The characteristics of the first group are the existence of 
outsider economies with large stock markets, dispersed ownership, strong investor rights, and 
strong legal enforcement. The second group has insider economies with less-developed stock 
markets, more concentrated ownership, weak investor rights, but strong legal enforcement. The 
third group features insider economies with weak legal enforcement.  
The countries involved in the current study, the UK and Spain, are at opposite ends of this 
spectrum, with the UK in the first group representing economies with widely developed stock 
markets and Spain in the third group representing economies with less developed stock markets. 
Thus, the selection of these two countries is particularly interesting because of their differences in 
culture, legal, and institutional systems (La Porta et al. 1997; 1998) providing useful insights for 
the international business research. Besides, prior research finds that the country legal and 
institutional environment influences corporate reporting and, in particular, countries with strong 
legal environments such as the UK have better disclosure quality than countries with weak legal 
environments such as Spain. 
 
3. THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
The integration of agency theory and proprietary costs helps us to understand better the trade-offs 
between costs and benefits associated with voluntary disclosure and disclosure timing in an 
international context. Agency theory posits that the separation of ownership and control in 
publicly listed companies gives rise to information asymmetries and conflict of interest between 
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managers and investors where managers have superior information (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
The theory predicts that the manager (agent) will act in his or her own interest rather than in the 
interest of the owners (principal). Agency theory asserts that disclosure may reduce the agency 
costs in the relationship between the fund providers and the management (Prencipe 2004). In the 
presence of information asymmetries, a mechanism is needed to adequately align the wealth-
maximizing incentives of corporate managers with those of the shareholders. Corporate 
disclosure is critical to reduce this information asymmetry and lead to more efficient capital 
markets. Institutional characteristics of different countries may affect agency costs in relation to 
voluntary disclosure differently. In this sense, Shi et al. (2012) emphasizes the need to investigate 
this issue in an international context. 
One of the main disincentives to providing discretionary disclosure is that of proprietary 
costs (Healy and Palepu 2001). Proprietary costs are particularly important in decisions about 
voluntary disclosure (Meek, Roberts and Gray 1995). Proprietary cost theory (Verrecchia 1983; 
Wagenhofer 1990) is based on the premise that companies limit voluntary disclosure of 
information to the financial market because of the existence of disclosure related costs 
(proprietary costs). These costs relate to preparing and disseminating information and also the 
cost originating from disclosing information which may be used by competitors and other parties 
and which may harm the reporting company. Proprietary cost theory is linked to agency costs 
theory in that a company with low proprietary costs (e.g. low growth opportunities) will probably 
have higher agency costs than one with high proprietary costs. This is so because companies with 
a lower level of proprietary costs are also likely to be those with lower cash flow due to 
inadequate management and this leads to higher agency costs (Doukas, McKnight and Pantzalis 
2005). The consequence is that companies with high proprietary costs have fewer incentives to 
voluntarily disclose information. 
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Moreover, the extent to which voluntary disclosures provide useful information to market 
participants will depend not only on the nature of the information released but also on when it is 
released (Healy and Palepu 2001; IASB 2008). Companies may wish to deter competitors’ market 
entry by withholding good news. However, sometimes companies do not have any choice because 
rational investors may interpret nondisclosure as an indication of the existence of unfavorable 
information (Francis et al. 2008; Verrecchia 1990). Therefore, we first address the issue of the 
management decision to disclose information voluntarily and the effect of the existence of 
proprietary costs on this decision. After considering the initial decision to disclose, we then 
explore the factors that influence the decision of the timing of the release (i.e. managers have 
discretion in choosing the date on which they make the disclosure).  
 
3.1. Proprietary Costs and Voluntary Disclosure 
Proprietary cost theory is based on the assumption that, in the absence of these costs, companies 
have incentives to disclose information voluntarily to the market to reduce information 
asymmetry. The existence of proprietary costs alters the equilibrium model. 
According to Verrecchia (1983), the higher the proprietary costs associated with the 
disclosure, the less negatively investors react to the withholding of relevant information, which 
leads to a lower probability of companies voluntarily disclosing information. From a different 
perspective, revealing information on growth opportunities, which would attract new investors, 
could have a favourable effect on reducing agency costs. Due to the noise caused by the agency 
conflict and information problem, it is difficult for management to make disclosure decisions. 
When disclosing information, management has to consider costs and benefits to determine 
whether the benefits of disclosure outweigh the costs. Management reluctance to disclose can 
have numerous motivations. Lundholm and Van Winkle (2006) summarize these motivations and 
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argue that there are situations where management obtains no benefits from disclosure or incurs in 
high proprietary costs not covered by the benefits.  
Analytical studies consider the situation where a competitive environment gives rise to a 
preference for withholding information (Darrough and Stoughton 1990; Spulber 1995; 
Wagenhofer 1990). Dontoh (1989) shows that managers have incentives to disclose both good 
and bad news. They support the theory that managers disclose good news to stockholders and bad 
news to competitors. This research implies that negative news is intended to discourage potential 
competitors from entering the market. Empirical studies have also demonstrated that the higher 
the proprietary costs, as measured by growth opportunities, the more reluctant managers are to 
reveal information that could support the value of these opportunities and encourage competitors 
to join the market (Bamber and Cheon 1998; Clarkson et al. 1994). Accordingly, the following 
hypothesis is suggested:  
H1: Companies with higher proprietary information costs (i.e. potential for growth) are 
less likely to issue an ARPR 
 
3.2. Determinants of Timing 
Providing certain disclosures leads companies to make an implicit commitment to issuing similar 
disclosures in the future (Einhorn and Ziv 2008). Therefore, not disclosing is sometimes not an 
option for companies. In this context, the timing of the disclosures might be an additional lever 
for managers as part of their communication strategies. Consequently, after considering the 
decision to disclose, we now investigate the factors affecting the timing of the release. 
Using the framework provided by agency theory, we explore whether disclosure timing is 
affected by differences in legal systems and institutional characteristics existing between 
countries. According to agency theory, even for managers with incentives to share information 
with outsiders and reduce information asymmetry, the legal environment and the institutional 
characteristics of the country where the company operates is a key aspect that should be 
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considered, and will determine the managers’ behavior in relation to disclosure practices (Leuz et 
al. 2003). As such, we look at the effect of country on timing.  
Agency theory is based on management self-interest which leads to the need for 
monitoring devices to align their interest to those of the stockholders. The implication is that 
companies may be interested in investing in information systems to control managers’ 
opportunism (Eisenhardt 1989). As a result, we also investigate the role of investor relations as a 
determinant of timing. One of the most important management monitoring strategies derived from 
agency theory is the corporate information system (Eisenhardt 1989). Information helps to reduce 
asymmetries between managers and owners and mitigate agency conflicts (Jensen and Meckling 
1976). Investor relations departments function as intermediaries to provide financial markets with 
information about the company. Therefore, we examine the role of investor relations as an 
information control system to improve corporate transparency and reduce agency costs. We also 
investigate the effect of country as a moderating effect influencing the relationship between IRD 
and timing. 
Another factor that is considered in this study is corporate performance. Performance is 
also a key factor related to corporate agency problems (Eisenhardt 1989). In line with agency 
theory, the timing of news depending on the direction of the performance, and moderated by the 
country where the company operates, is scrutinized in our study.  
 
3.2.1 The effect of country on timing 
In a capital market context, investors’ perceptions of a firm are important to corporate managers 
expecting to issue public debt or equity or to acquire another company in a stock transaction 
(Healy and Palepu 1993). Consequently, publicly listed companies intending to attract funds have 
incentives to provide voluntary disclosure which will lead to reducing information asymmetry 
and increasing transparency and credibility (Healy and Palepu 2001). The increase of 
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transparency and credibility reduces the firm’s cost of external financing. Besides demanding 
greater disclosure, investors also expect timely information from firms in which they are 
interested in investing (Bushee, Matsumoto and Miller 2003; Bushee and Noe 2000). The demand 
for timely information would be more evident in more liquid markets and also with more 
institutional investors (Sengupta 2004).  
We explore the extent to which differences in disclosure timing may be explained by 
existing differences between countries. Agency problems are influenced by the legal environment 
leading to the need for corporate control mechanisms to constrain the conflict of interests between 
the organizational players (managers and owners), which vary significantly across different 
institutional settings (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Sheleifer and Vishny 2000). Our main interest 
is related to the differences in the timing of ARPRs of Spanish and UK listed companies. It is 
expected that disclosure practice differences among countries (Meek et al. 1995) also affect the 
timing of disclosures. Agency costs are higher for companies with higher outside capital and with 
more concentrated and sophisticated ownership (Eisenhardt 1989; Jensen and Meckling 1976) 
and these companies are expected to release information faster to reduce information asymmetry. 
In our case, the UK has a more liquid market, greater spread ownership, and a higher number of 
institutional investors than does Spain (Corporate Governance Report 2005; Leuz et al. 2003). 
Therefore, we should expect that companies operating in the UK will have a shorter delay in 
releasing an ARPR to the market than companies operating in Spain. The hypothesis in this 
respect is as follows. 
H2: UK companies are likely to disclose an ARPR earlier than Spanish companies  
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3.2.2. The effect of investor relations department on timing 
The aim to reduce information asymmetry and to improve the quality of information as proposed 
by agency theory, leads companies to find means to achieve this goal. Investor relations 
departments help in this task (Oxelheim, Randøy and Stonehill 2001). The investor relations 
function can assist companies in improving the communication process with market participants. 
The investor relations effect is reflected in the increase of corporate visibility as well as in the 
increase of market liquidity and reduction of cost of capital (Easley and O´Hara 2004).  
Investor relations is defined as a strategic management responsibility that integrates 
finance, communication, marketing and securities law compliance to enable the most effective 
two-way communication between a company, the financial community, and other constituencies, 
which ultimately contributes to a company’s securities achieving fair valuation (NIRI 2003). 
Thus, investor relations departments improve corporate disclosure strategy and maintain a good 
quality of disclosure (Marston and Straker 2001). They play a significant role in the corporate 
communication strategy and have the task of creating and managing the flow of their companies’ 
information, as well as to prioritizing how, where and to whom the information is circulated 
(NIRI 2002). For example, Ettredge, Richardson and Scholz (2001) argue that investor relations 
departments provide individual investors with comprehensive information on a timely basis that 
was in the past only available to a limited group of investors, such as analysts and institutional 
investors. We therefore expect that: 
H3: Companies which have an investor relations department are more likely to issue an 
ARPR earlier than those which do not have one 
 
As argued above, the investor relations function plays an important role in reducing 
agency costs and facilitating capital market transactions and improving market liquidity (Easley 
and O´Hara 2004). However, the development of the investor relations function has been different 
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across countries. In the case of Spain, the functions of investor relations and public relations are 
still developing. Spanish companies started organizing communication departments and 
developing corporate communication strategies relatively recently in comparison with other 
western European countries and, particularly, the UK. For example, according to studies 
conducted by Dircom in 1999 and 2004 (Dircom 2000; 2005) the majority of Spanish companies 
have communication departments but they are of recent vintage
3
. Consistent with the above 
evidence, country effect is likely to moderate the relationship between timing of disclosure and 
the existence of an investor relations department. Therefore, we hypothesize that the effect of 
investor relations departments on improving the timing (releasing earlier) of ARPRs will be 
stronger for UK companies than for Spanish ones. According to this argument we pose the 
following hypothesis. 
H3a: The relationship between the existence of an investor relations department and 
timing is moderated by the country where the company operates: Spanish companies with 
an investor relations department are likely to issue the ARPR later than UK companies 
 
3.2.3. The effect of corporate performance on timing 
Agency theory suggests that companies with better results are more likely to disclose information 
voluntarily (Ng and Koh 1994). If a manager’s intention is to signal quality and firm value, s/he 
may not have the choice of not disclosing because this could be interpreted as withholding 
unfavorable information (Hughes 1986). When the non-disclosure is not an option because of the 
market conditions, managers may use discretion related to the timing of disclosure to effectively 
guide market participants’ decisions (Daft and Lengel 1986). In a capital market setting, 
companies with good news have incentives to disclose the news early to attract investment. Prior 
literature has documented that the type of news to be released (good or bad news) affects the 
timing of releases (Begley and Fischer 1998; Chambers and Penman 1984; Givoly and Palmon 
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1982; Kross 1981; Kross and Schroeder 1984; Sengupta 2004). Results of these studies show that 
the disclosure lag is longer for firms disclosing bad news
4
. More recently, Sengupta (2004) 
confirms the results supporting the contention that good news is reported earlier in a study of 
quarterly earnings announcements. In line with this argument, the following hypothesis is 
proposed. 
H4: Companies with better performance are more likely to issue ARPRs earlier than 
those with bad performance 
 
The association between corporate performance and timing of disclosure may be affected 
by the institutional context investigated. As argued earlier, the presence of institutional and less 
concentrated ownership leads to more timely disclosure while the existence of bad news leads to 
less timely disclosure (Sengupta 2004). It is also argued that firms with negative earnings news 
are more likely to be subject to litigation (Healy and Palepu 2001) and, therefore, in a higher 
litigious environment these companies have incentives to release their bad news quickly. In line 
with this argument, empirical evidence shows that litigation risk makes companies pre-empt bad 
news earnings by using voluntary disclosures (Skinner 1994). Following the above 
argumentation, UK companies which have a stronger presence of institutional investors, lower 
ownership concentration, and that face higher litigation risk than Spanish ones (La Porta et al. 
1997; 1998; Leuz et al. 2003), would have more incentives to disclose bad news earlier. 
According to this, we can expect the following. 
H4a: The relationship between corporate performance and timing is moderated by the 
country where the company operates: UK companies with worse performance are more 
likely to disclose earlier 
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4. METHOD 
4.1. Sample Selection Process 
The analysis carried out in this paper is performed using data from the year 2000. A single year of 
data is examined to eliminate the potential confounding effects of changes in reporting rules over 
time and 2000 is selected to avoid the period in which the major recent financial scandals started. 
Since the Enron scandal came to light in 2001, the accounts of many other large US companies 
have been scrutinized and other scandals have emerged. The SEC issued its first cautionary 
advice on pro forma reporting in December 2001 (Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
2001). This could affect not only the qualitative characteristics of the information content of 
disclosures but also the decision to disclose. In order to avoid this distorting effect, ARPRs issued 
during the year before these scandals came to light have been chosen as the focus of this study.  
In this paper we include the entire population of publicly-listed Spanish companies. The 
population comprises 123 Spanish companies listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange after 
excluding foreign companies and investment societies. The population of Spanish companies is 
matched to a sample of UK companies. The matching process is done by industry and size 
following prior literature (for example, Hussein 1996; Lang and Lundholm 2000). A matched-
pair design
5
 consists of selecting a UK firm in the same industry
6
 and of a size similar to each 
Spanish company in the sample. Where more than one match was possible based on industry, the 
potential match closest in size was selected. This matching process resulted in 123 Spanish 
companies and 123 UK companies with similar characteristics for industry and capital market 
value
7
. Industry codes are obtained from Datastream whose index is based on categories used by 
the Financial Times. A fiscal year-end restriction is not applied. Therefore, companies that may 
have reporting periods other than for the calendar year 2000 are included
8
. 
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4.2. Collecting Press Releases 
The ARPRs analysed in this study were gathered first from official sources (Comisión Nacional 
del Mercado de Valores – CNMV for Spanish ARPRs and Regulatory News Service-RNS for UK 
ARPRs). Where the ARPR was not available from this source, the company website was 
searched. Companies post ARPRs on their websites using the link ‘media’ or ‘investor relations’. 
In the event of failure to locate an ARPR by these means, one of the authors made direct contact 
with the company to request the ARPR. This ensured that we gathered all ARPRs issued by the 
companies included in our sample. Out of the 246 companies, 52 Spanish and 22 UK companies 
did not issue an ARPR, representing 30% of the total sample. At country level, this indicates that 
42% of the Spanish and 18% of the UK companies did not issue an ARPR. These differences in 
disclosure by country are statistically significant (Chi-square=17.39, p=0.00).  
 
4.3. Measurement of Disclosure Levels and Timing 
Measuring the extent of voluntary disclosure is one of the major limitations of research in this 
area (Healy and Palepu 2001). Prior work has used different proxies including management 
forecasts (Miller and Piotroski 2000) or data from databases (for example, the Center for 
International Financial Analysis) (e.g. Hope 2003; Hope, Kang, Thomas and Yoo 2008; Jaggi and 
Low 2000). This study uses, as a measure of voluntary disclosure, the manager’s decision to issue 
ARPRs. Our measure is more objective than an index based on items included in a corporate 
report (Buzby 1974; Cerf 1961; Choi 1973; Hussein 1996) because these indices are subject to the 
researcher’s way of constructing them (Marston and Shrives 1991). The press releases 
investigated in this study are an important means of corporate disclosure because they influence 
investors’ decision-making processes and are timelier than annual reports (Bowen, Davis and 
Matsumoto 2005; Francis, Schipper and Vincent 2002; Lang and Lundholm 2000). 
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To measure timing, we follow prior literature and define a variable name, LAG, which is 
the number of days between the date of the ARPR and the end of the fiscal year (Bamber and 
Cheon 1998; Sengupta 2004).  
 
4.4. Measurement of Independent Variables and Controls 
4.4.1. Characteristics of companies issuing an ARPR 
Our first model investigates the effect of proprietary costs on the decision to issue an ARPR. The 
proxy to measure proprietary information costs (GROWTH) is calculated as the market value 
scaled by total equity in year t-1
9
. Our models also include several controls for management 
opportunities to engage in voluntary disclosure. We include potential for growth in the future 
(Clarkson et al. 1994). This proxy is the market-to-book ratio measured as market value scaled by 
total equity in year t (GROWTH_FU). We include a dummy variable (COUNTRY) that takes the 
value of 1 for UK and 0 for Spain. Research has shown that managers place great importance on 
simply meeting or exceeding a benchmark (Bowen et al. 2005; Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal 
2005; Short and Palmer 2003). This benchmark is more important than ‘analysts’ consensus 
estimate’ and ‘reporting a profit’ in the ranking of measures used by CFOs to assess company 
performance (Graham et al. 2005). To capture the effect of company performance in the decision 
to issue an ARPR, we include a dummy variable (PERFORMANCE) which takes a value of 1 
(Good news companies) when net profit for the current year exceeds the firm’s net for the prior 
year and 0 (Bad news companies) when net profit for the current year does not exceed the net 
profit for the prior year. As in prior literature, we control for company size, growth opportunities 
and proprietary costs (Aljifri and Khasharmeh 2006; Bamber and Cheon 1998; Botosan and 
Harris 2000; Gaver and Gaver 1993)
10
. 
Company size is shown to be linked to different measures of disclosure in prior literature 
(Bushee et al. 2003; Frankel, Johnson and Skinner 1999; Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta 
2006; Lang and Lundholm 1993). In this study, we define SIZE as the natural logarithm of the 
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company market capitalisation (Bushee et al. 2003). Operating profit is also included as a control 
variable following prior literature (Schleicher, Hussainey and Walker 2007; Schleicher and 
Walker 2010). Schleicher et al. (2007) show that operating income (OPERA_PROF) is strongly 
associated with other measures of earnings persistence. They argue that the negative or declining 
income number has a higher impact on readers when this is a permanent rather than a transitory 
earnings number. Leverage (LEVERAGE) is a measure of company risk and it is included in 
most of the studies related to disclosure behavior (Archambault and Archambault 2003; Meek et 
al. 1995). Prior research suggests that disclosure levels and quality vary depending on the 
industrial sector examined (Botosan 1997). In this study, industry (INDUSTRY) is classified into 
the following sectors: 1=consumer and capital intermediate goods, 2=construction, 3=financial 
services.  
 
4.4.2. Effect of timing on disclosure 
Once management has decided to issue an ARPR the decision in relation to the date of disclosure 
must be addressed. Managers have discretion in this regard and therefore, their decision may be 
associated with or explained by, different factors. We include COUNTRY and PERFORMANCE, 
which are measured as in the previous model. COUNTRY proxies for two different capital 
market development levels which also represent opposite institutional settings (the UK being a 
large developed capital market and Spain being a less developed one) (Leuz et al. 2003). 
Companies with bad news have fewer incentives to disclose quickly but are also more likely to be 
subject to litigation which may lead them to pre-empt their bad news (Healy and Palepu 2001; 
Skinner 1997; Skinner 1994). This effect is captured by the dummy variable PERFORMANCE. 
Additionally, we consider Investor Relations Department (IRD) as a dummy variable which takes 
the value of 1 if the company has an IRD or investor relations officer (IRO). To measure this we 
first checked all company websites to determine the existence of an investor relations function. 
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Secondly, ARPRs themselves include information about the person, department or external 
company (company communications) that has issued the company ARPR. Most ARPRs are 
signed either by a public relations company or by the financial manager, chief executive, etc. 
Thirdly, when there was not enough data available to the researchers to determine the existence of 
an IRD or IRO, one of the authors contacted the company to request this information. When the 
firm has an IRD and/or an IRO exclusively dedicated to public relations functions, the variable 
gets a value of 1, and 0 otherwise. This approach is similar to that in Marston (1996) and Marston 
and Straker (2001). We include SIZE and INDUSTRY as control variables. SIZE may proxy for 
different effects. Larger companies have higher agency costs and also proxy for a richer 
information environment (Jeong 2009). SIZE and INDUSTRY are measured as in the previous 
model. 
 
4.5. Statistical Analysis 
Our analysis proceeds in two stages. We first explore company growth opportunities affecting the 
release of an ARPR. The dependent variable is dichotomous (issuers/non-issuers of ARPRs) and 
we perform logistic regression. The basic logistic regression model (1) that examines empirically 
the relationship between the decision to issue an ARPR and the explanatory variables is the 
following:  
log (p/1-p) = 0 +1 GROWTH + 2 GROWTH_FU + 3 COUNTRY +4 PERFORMANCE + 5 
SIZE + 6 OPERA_PERF+ 7 LEVERAGE + 8 INDUSTRY 
 
where GROWTH is market-to-book ratio measured as market value scaled by total equity in year 
t-1. As well as the main variable, we include a number of control variables. GROWTH_FU is the 
market-to-book ratio measured as market value scaled by total equity in year t. COUNTRY is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for UK and 0 for Spain. PERFORMANCE is 1 (Good 
news companies) when net profit for the current year exceeds the firm’s net profit for the prior 
(1) 
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year and 0 (Bad news companies) when net profit for the current year does not exceed the net 
profit for the prior year. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the company market capitalisation. 
OPERA_PROF is operating profit measured by Worldscope item WC01250 and it represents the 
difference between sales and total operating expenses. The measure excludes operating and non-
operating exceptional items. LEVERAGE is the leverage ratio measured as total debt to total 
asset Worldscope item WC08236. INDUSTRY is a categorical variable with four levels as 
follows, 1=consumer and capital intermediate goods, 2=construction, 3=financial services. 
Secondly, we investigate the effect of the timing of disclosure, performing survival 
analysis regression. We add a number of interactions to analyze in more detail the effect of the 
existence of an IRD and company performance on the timing of ARPRs. The full model (2) is as 
follows. 
Log LAG = 0 + 1 COUNTRY + 2 IRD +3 PERFORMANCE + 4 IRD*COUNTRY + 5 
PERFORMANCE*COUNTRY + 6 SIZE + 7 INDUSTRY  
 
where IRD is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the company has an investor 
relations department and 0 if otherwise. The remaining variables are measured as in model (1). 
 
5. RESULTS 
5.1. Voluntary Disclosure of Press Releases 
5.1.1. Descriptive analysis 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the independent variables included in the study. Panel A 
shows the results for the Spanish sample and Panel B for the UK sample. In Panel C we report the 
descriptive statistics for the entire sample. Table 2 shows the Pearson correlations for the 
independent variables (non-tabulated results for Spearman correlations are similar). In general, 
UK companies seem to demonstrate worse performance (PERFORMANCE) than Spanish ones as 
evidenced by the negative correlation between the variables. However, the positive correlation 
between COUNTRY and GROWTH indicates that UK companies have higher levels of growth 
(2) 
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than their Spanish counterparts. Moreover, larger companies seem also to have higher growth and 
higher operating profits. To ensure that we do not have multicollinearity problems, we calculate 
variance inflation factors (VIF) for all variables in our models. VIF values over 10 indicate 
potential multicollinearity problems. The VIF values for all variables are close to one. The 
highest VIF in our models is 1.84 for SIZE which is a good value to discard multicollinearity 
(Allison 1999). 
************************** 
Tables 1 and 2 here 
************************* 
 
5.1.2. Multivariate analysis 
The primary results of the logistic regression are reported in Table 3. The results are presented in 
two columns, the first of which relates to Model 1 (does include industry) and the second to 
Model 1a (does not include industry). The results show that GROWTH is negatively associated 
with disclosure. This suggests that companies with higher potential for growth are less likely to 
promote this potential and allow competitors to get this positive signal. This is consistent with 
hypothesis 1. As in prior research (Guillamon-Saorin and Sousa 2010), we observe a significant 
positive association between the decision to issue an ARPR and COUNTRY. This indicates that 
UK companies are more likely to issue an ARPR than are Spanish ones. Moreover, the effect of 
company performance (whether the company has good or bad news to report) is also positively 
associated with voluntary disclosure of ARPRs, indicating that companies with better news to 
report are more likely to do so by issuing an ARPR. Our control variables are associated with 
disclosure and show the expected direction. Size is, as expected, positively associated with 
disclosure of an ARPR. As in previous studies (Schleicher and Walker 2010), operating profit is 
also included to control for the persistence of earnings. As expected, the relationship is negative 
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and significant. Leverage is negatively associated with disclosure as in prior literature (Eng and 
Mak 2003).  
We perform the Hosmer-Lemeshow test of goodness-of-fit (Hosmer and Lemeshow 
1989), and their results show that the models fit the data well.  
************************** 
Table 3 here 
************************* 
 
5.2. Timing of Disclosure 
For the ARPRs included in this study, the mean of the number of days between the year-end and 
disclosure of an ARPR is 59 days, with a range that varies between a minimum of 3 days and a 
maximum of 145 days. Therefore, ARPRs can be considered timely disclosures. Moreover, the 
mean number of days between the year end and the disclosure of the ARPR by country is 50 days 
for Spanish companies and 66 for the UK ones. As in prior literature we perform survival analysis 
(Audretsch and Lehmann 2005; Jain and Martin 2005). This analysis investigates at which point 
in time the subjects were affected by the event of interest (Allison 2000; SAS Institute 2004) and 
it is operationalized by the Cox Proportional Hazard model. The results of the regression applying 
the Cox Proportional Hazard model are presented in Table 4. Since the dependent variable is the 
log of hazard, negative coefficients indicate that the lag period is longer. One of the main 
assumptions of the Cox Proportional Hazard model is proportionality. We verify that our model 
satisfies this assumption by including time-dependent covariates in the model. Time-dependent 
covariates are interactions of the predictors with time. In particular, we choose to use the 
interactions of our variables with log (LAG) because this is the most common function used. All 
our time-dependent covariates are insignificant, which means that there is no violation of the 
proportionality assumption. Furthermore, we check the proportionality of all the categorical 
predictors using the Kaplan-Meier curves. 
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Our main analysis is included in Table 4. The results indicate that UK companies delay 
the release of the ARPR longer than the Spanish ones, which contradicts our hypothesis (H2). 
Contrary to expectations, companies with an IRD delay the ARPR more than those that do not 
have one (H3). We engage in a deeper investigation of this relationship by analyzing the effect of 
the country as a moderating factor (H3a). Model 2a provides an analysis of the effect of the 
existence of an IRD on the decision to issue an ARPR for each country. The estimated coefficient 
on the interactive term IRD*COUNTRY (H3a) is positive and a significant estimate=0.74, 
p=0.03). This indicates that the delay due to IRD is shorter for UK companies than for Spanish 
ones. Corporate performance does not seem to affect the timing of the ARPR (H4). Results 
(Model 2b Table 4) support prior literature by showing that companies performing better delay 
less than companies performing poorly (estimate=0.86, p=0.01). In our case, this effect is driven 
by country as the variable PERFORMANCE in Table 4 only becomes significant when the 
interaction term (PERFORMANCE*COUNTRY) is included in the model (Model 2b). This 
second interaction term of the analysis, PERFORMANCE*COUNTRY (H4a), is negative and 
significant (estimate=-1.05, p=0.00) indicating that the country moderates the effect of corporate 
performance on the timing of the ARPR. According to this, UK companies with better 
performance delay longer the issuance of the ARPR. This is consistent with the theory advanced 
earlier that companies facing higher litigation risks are more likely to pre-empt bad news by 
issuing a press release early (Begley and Fischer 1998).  
Regarding the interactions, the addition of the two interactions between voluntary 
disclosure lag and the factors included in the study (Models 2, 2a and 2b) results in an increase in 
the models Likelihood Ratio (2 from 34.80 in Model 2 to 46.58 in Model 2b). 
************************** 
Table 4 here 
************************* 
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5.3. Additional Tests on the Decision to Issue an ARPR 
We test for a number of factors which have been included in prior studies to control for their 
effect on disclosure. 
 
5.3.1. Control variables affecting disclosure 
Analysts following and acquisitions 
As in prior work, we find a positive association between the disclosure of a press release and the 
number of analysts following the company (Guillamon-Saorin and Sousa 2010). Moreover, no 
effect on management decision to disclose these releases is found for companies facing 
acquisitions.  
Company risk 
As in prior literature (Bamber and Cheon 1998) we check whether companies facing more risk 
would have different disclosure practices. We include a proxy for risk (BETA) which shows the 
relationship between the volatility of the stock and the volatility of the market. This is measured 
by Worldscope item WC09802. Results not tabulated remain unchanged for the rest of the factors 
and BETA does not show any statistical association with the decision to issue an ARPR.  
Capital requirement 
A well-known measure of entry barrier used in the industrial organization literature is capital 
requirement (Clarkson et al. 1994). We perform an additional test to check the effect of this factor 
in our analysis. As in prior literature the variable is measured as gross property, plant and 
equipment expressed as a percentage of total asset (Clarkson et al. 1994). Property, plant and 
equipment represent tangible assets with an expected useful life of over one year which are 
expected to be used to produce goods for sale or for distribution services (Worldscope item 
WC02301). Results are not significant.  
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5.3.2. Sensitivity analyses 
Considering that our dependent variable (LAG), which measures the number of days between the 
year-end and the date of the ARPR, is left truncated , we rerun models (2) (2a) and (2b) using a 
limited dependent variables approach as a sensitivity test (Maddala 1991; SAS Institute 2004; 
Schleicher and Walker 2010; Tobin 1958). In particular, we use Tobit regression to run the 
model. The Tobit model, also called a censored regression model, is designed to estimate linear 
relationships between variables when there is either left- or right-censoring in the dependent 
variable. This is because our sample contained no data with values less than 1 for the dependent 
variable. Results of this alternative specification are presented in Table 5. Results are consistent 
with the main results shown in Table 4. The outputs contain an estimate of the standard error of 
SIGMA. That SIGMA is statistically significant means that the coefficient is statistically 
significantly different from 0. 
************************** 
Table 5 here 
************************* 
 
In addition to the main analysis carried out using survival analysis, we run a regression 
using the Heckman method (Heckman 1979) which overcomes self-selection bias by controlling 
for potential endogeneity issues. Endogeneity might exist in the decision concerning the date of 
disclosure of the ARPR in relation to whether or not to issue the ARPR at all. We run models (1) 
and (2) as a system of equations. Then, equation (2) is used to calculate the inverse Mill’s ratio 
which is included as an additional regressor (IMR) in model (1). This method corrects for 
potential sample selection bias. The results are reported in Table 6. In all three regressions, IMR 
is not significant. The other results are mostly consistent with what was previously reported. 
Specifically, COUNTRY and IRD are positive and significantly associated with the delay of the 
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ARPR. The interactions also show the same sign and significant association. This means that our 
results do not suffer from self-selection biases. 
************************** 
Table 6 here 
************************* 
 
5.3.3. Stability of results over time 
In our tests, we use a sample of firms from 2000, immediately before the spate of financial 
scandals at the beginning of this century. A potential concern about the results is that they may 
not be stable over time and might have been influenced by lenient regulation before the financial 
scandals took place. As a sensitivity analysis we run all the main tests using data obtained for 
year 2005, before the financial crisis and after the financial scandals. The results obtained from 
that sample are mostly consistent with those reported here and confirm that COUNTRY and IRD 
affect companies’ delay in issuing an ARPR. Moreover, results for 2005 also support the 
moderating effect of COUNTRY when looking at the association between IRD and the timing of 
ARPRs. UK companies with an IRD issue the ARPR earlier. The only difference in the results for 
2005 is related to the interaction between PERFORMANCE and COUNTRY. For the 2005 data, 
this interaction is not significant. This confirmatory evidence using data from a different year 
strongly supports the validity of the reported evidence and allows us to generalize the results.  
 
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
Our work produces interesting outputs which help in understanding voluntary disclosure behavior 
in an international context. Consistent with agency theory, the cross-national setting investigated 
in this study confirms the differences in disclosure practices across countries (Gray 1988). 
Agency problems differ greatly across countries in part because of the different legal systems in 
place (La Porta et al. 2000). Disclosure timing is clearly affected by national influences. 
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Interestingly, our work points to the hypothesis of a moderating effect of country on the timing of 
disclosure.  
In addition to the national influence, in general, the corporate optimal disclosure strategy 
is determined by the cost and benefits of disclosure. An assessment of these costs and benefits 
allows managers to decide on the nature, content and timing of disclosures. We attempt to 
scrutinize the factors that affect management disclosure decisions. The characteristics of our 
study design provide us with a setting where we can test two management decisions: (1) whether 
to issue or not to issue an ARPR, and (2) the timing of the ARPR, thereby giving a clearer picture 
of the corporate disclosure strategies in place.  
Our research is innovative in that we investigate a corporate communication venue and 
determinants that have not been addressed in prior work. As suggested in previous studies, we 
investigate ARPRs posted on the companies’ websites (Lim, Matolcsy and Chow 2007). These 
venues are particularly interesting because they reach a wider audience (Bamber and Cheon 
1998), enhance the visibility of the company (Bushee and Miller 2007), are more timely (Aerts 
and Cormier 2009), and therefore, have more capacity to change readers’ impressions (Daft and 
Lengel 1986) than other more formal corporate disclosures such as annual reports. Thus, they 
present an appropriate tool and setting to investigate the incentives managers have to vary the 
timing of these disclosures and whether the timing choices are related to agency costs. 
The first decision made by the manager is whether to issue an ARPR. We argue that this 
decision is associated with the level of proprietary costs faced by the company. For example, in a 
competitive global environment managers may think that the market is not informationally 
efficient and decide to avoid promoting growth opportunities, which could encourage competitors 
to join the market, through voluntary disclosure (Bamber and Cheon 1998; Clarkson et al. 1994; 
Durnev, Errunza and Molchanov 2009). Thus, management may decide not to release an ARPR. 
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Our results show a negative association between the decision to issue an ARPR and our measure 
of proprietary information cost, thereby supporting our first hypothesis. 
Companies’ current disclosure practice may imply a commitment for future similar 
disclosures (Einhorn and Ziv 2008). Therefore, companies may not have the option of not 
disclosing. In this context, managing the timing of disclosure allows managers further discretion 
in their communication strategies. According to the literature on capital market and disclosure 
and consistent with agency theory, more liquid markets (i.e. the UK) would demand more timely 
information (Sengupta 2004). Our results show that the direction of the effect between timing and 
country is contrary to expectations. UK companies seem to have higher delay in issuing ARPRs 
than do Spanish ones. One possible explanation for this result is a substitutive effect of 
information timeliness to compensate the weak legal and institutional disclosure requirement with 
the aim of providing a better signal to market participants (Durnev et al. 2009). Management may 
use different reporting strategies as a signaling tool to influence the perceptions of investors 
(Fields, Lys and Vincent 2001). In this case, Spanish companies could be using disclosure 
timeliness to send a positive signal to potential investors.  
The role of an IR function also helps to improve the quality of information flowing from 
the company to the market, which increases corporate visibility and improves market liquidity 
(Easley and O´Hara 2004). This IR function could be considered an information system which 
monitors management potential opportunistic behavior (Eisenhardt 1989). The relationship 
between the existence of an IRD and timing provides interesting insights not discussed previously 
in the literature. The direct effect is contrary to expectations with companies that have an IRD 
showing longer delay in the release of ARPRs. As mentioned above, managers may use different 
strategies to signal transparency and good disclosure practices to investors. Voluntary disclosure 
and timeliness usually signal informativeness but other elements such as the existence of an IRD, 
whose specific role is to maintain a good quality of disclosure, may send a strong signal to 
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investors in relation to corporate information transparency (Ettredge, Richardson and Scholz 
2001; 2002; Marston and Straker 2001). Managers may consider the existence of an IRD as a 
substitute of timeliness. Thus, the existence of an IRD may reduce agency cost and timely 
disclosure would be less urgent for companies. This is evidenced when internal processes need to 
substitute external shortages in disclosure requirement such as in Spain. In this context, indicating 
transparency is the most important objective of voluntary disclosure and this is probably signalled 
by the presence of a corporate IR function.  
The existence of moderating effects in this relationship is also observed in this case. The 
examination of the interaction between country and the existence of an IRD allows us to examine 
this relationship in more detail. We find that the country where the company operates plays an 
important role in helping to understand the relationship between the existence of an IRD and the 
timing of the disclosures. In particular, we argue that the different level of development of the IR 
function in Spain (less developed IR function) in relation to the UK (more developed IR function) 
(Dircom 2000; 2005) affects this association. The results show that the delay in releasing an 
ARPR after the year-end decreases for UK companies which have an IRD. This supports 
hypothesis H3a and is consistent with our expectations. 
In general, companies operating in capital markets have incentives to disclose good news 
early to attract investment. We find that firms with bad news are less likely to voluntarily disclose 
information (Ajinkya, Bhojraj and Sengupta 2005), but contrary to expectations and to the 
evidence found in prior literature (Sengupta 2004), we do not find a direct strong association 
between company performance and timing. This could be due to the interplay of proprietary and 
agency costs. On the one hand, companies would have incentives to disclose quickly to increase 
transparency and reduce agency costs and on the other, the effect of proprietary costs may 
motivate management to withhold or delay information on good performance to protect its 
competitive advantage (Botosan and Stanford 2005; Harris 1998). Further, we argue that the 
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timing of disclosure of good and bad news may be affected by the institutional context in which 
the company operates. Moreover, the litigation environment also affects the disclosure timing of 
good and bad news (Begley and Fischer 1998; Givoly and Palmon 1982; Kross 1981; Sengupta 
2004). In particular, we find that UK companies which have a stronger presence of institutional 
investors, lower ownership concentration and face higher litigation risk, disclose bad news faster 
than Spanish ones (La Porta et al. 1997; 1998; Leuz et al. 2003).  
It is also interesting to note that our results indicate that large companies are more likely 
to disclose ARPR earlier than small ones. Large companies attract more scrutiny and have a 
higher number of investors who are likely to be concerned about receiving timely information 
from those firms in which they are investing (Sengupta 2004). This is also explained by agency 
theory. Large companies have higher agency costs (Jensen and Meckling 1976) and this leads 
them to implement more efficient information systems to reduce asymmetries with investors and 
other stockholders (Eisenhardt 1989).  
 
6.1. Implications for Practice 
Implications for managers 
Given the international dimension of capital markets activities, investors can no longer afford to 
remain ignorant about international disclosure practices. Cross-national differences seem to be 
key to the disclosure and the timing decision. Our results show that managers from different 
countries have different information disclosure incentives. Therefore, managers should be 
interested in our results because the diversity of international accounting and disclosure practices 
is a barrier that may affect the pricing of securities and the composition of international 
portfolios. In particular, if the timing of disclosure is different among countries, it is likely to be 
reflected in the investment decision-making process of investors. This may affect the efficiency 
of the financial markets and capital flows worldwide. Global financial markets require more 
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comparable information and also similar reporting and disclosure processes. International players 
such as managers of multinationals (MNEs) might also be interested in these differences. In this 
case, managers might be inclined to focus on international reporting and disclosure, paying less 
attention to the national trends (Doh and Guay 2004; Kolk 2005; Young, Ahlstrom and Bruton 
2004). However, managers should be aware of the differences among countries to face and design 
their disclosure strategies accordingly. For example, a MNE operating in different countries may 
need to be aware of the strategies followed by companies in weak legal systems, such as Spain, to 
signal transparency by using disclosure timeliness to overcome the weak legal environment 
inherent in the country or by using the IR function as a substitute of timeliness in other cases.  If 
MNE s´ policies are not adapted to local practices this may lead to an inaccurate assessment of the 
company (Shao, Kwok and Guedhami 2010). 
 
Implications for regulators  
Our research also has implications for regulators. For instance, standards-setting bodies should be 
interested in research attempting to explain corporate disclosure timing choices. Timing is an 
important dimension of disclosure which affects the usefulness of information reported 
(relevance) as well as the faithful representation of that information. This quality of information 
should be maximized as much as possible according to the IASB. Policy-makers should be 
interested in the evidence explaining incentives in relation to the reporting process that leads to 
significant systematic delays in earnings announcements. A better understanding of this process 
would allow them to issue regulation aimed at closely monitoring this dimension of disclosure, 
which has the potential to influence investors and affect market efficiency.  
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Implications for shareholders and potential shareholders 
Shareholders and potential shareholders should also be aware of the disclosure timing strategies 
followed by firms in different countries and the fact that they may depend on the direction of the 
news to be announced. Investors should also be aware of the strategies used by managers to signal 
transparency in different countries and which may be driven by the level of legal and institutional 
development (i.e. signaling transparency through timeliness or the existence of an IR function). If 
shareholders and potential shareholders misinterpret these management disclosure strategies as a 
lack of transparency, this may lead to a decrease in the company valuation and probably to a less 
efficient investment decision. Regulators should, therefore, promote standardised disclosure 
practices in order to achieve complete disclosure comparability, which would facilitate investors’ 
decision-making process resulting in more efficient investments. 
 
6.2. Limitations and Future Research 
Investigating the determinants of the timing of voluntary disclosure provides a limited view of the 
corporate disclosure strategy. Future research could investigate the association between the 
characteristics of the content of press release and timing. For example, the relationship between 
reliability, thematic manipulation, attributional bias or other strategies used by management to 
bias the content of ARPRs and timing could prove interesting. Using these strategies related to 
the content of ARPR, managers can create a positive image of the company through the press 
release despite the real financial performance (Brennan, Guillamon-Saorin and Pierce, 2009; 
Garcia Osma and Guillamon-Saorin, 2011). Evidence resulting from this association would 
clarify further the association between timing and corporate performance found in this study. 
Although we use cross-sectional analysis in this paper to eliminate the potential 
confounding effects of changes in reporting rules over time, the use of panel data to examine 
these relationships should be considered by future researchers. 
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In addition, the existing empirical and theoretical literature has tended to treat voluntary 
disclosures somewhat generically. For example, Francis et al. (2005) claim that voluntary 
disclosure practices seem to function independently of country-level. However, our results show 
clear differences in disclosure strategies across countries. It would seem desirable for future 
studies to recognize the importance of this refinement of the analysis of voluntary disclosure 
behavior. Moreover, future research could investigate whether country-level factors or firm-level 
factors matter more in defining firm disclosure. Further, the analysis of other countries would 
enhance our understanding of management disclosure motivations in different institutional 
settings. For example, multi-country-studies might be able to separate formal effects such as the 
origin of law from informal cultural aspects related to disclosure practice. 
 
ENDNOTES 
 
                                                 
1 Relevance is one of the qualitative characteristics that make financial information useful. The qualitative 
characteristics are complementary concepts but can be distinguished as fundamental (relevance and faithful 
representation) and enhancing (comparability, verifiability, timeliness, and understandability), based on 
how they affect the usefulness of information (IASB, 2008). 
2
 While a recent study by Guillamon-Saorin and Sousa (2010) investigates the factors that influence the 
disclosure of ARPRs, it does not look into proprietary costs related to corporate disclosure.  
3
 The study of 1999 (Dircom 2000) shows that only 58% of the companies have a communication manager 
to coordinate different communication activities . 
4
 These studies use different proxies  for news. For example, analyst forecast errors are used by Begley and 
Fischer (1998). Sengupta (2004) uses the median analyst forecast as a benchmark to be compared with 
actual EPS. 
5
 Using a matched-pair design allows a more precise comparison between the two countries and provides a 
natural control for industry and size (Lang and Lundholm 2000). 
6
 Datastream’s FTAG4 index, also called INDC4, has up to 38 industrial sectors based on the FTSE-
Actuaries system. It uses the same classification system for both Spanish and UK companies. 
7
 A Mann-Whitney U test is used to check for the differences between the sizes of the sample of companies 
for the two countries. Market value mean for the UK is EUR 6,670 million and for Spain EUR 3,324 
million. Results not tabulated showed no significant differences between the samples sizes (Z-statistic=-
0.04; p=0.48, two tailed probability). 
8
 All the ARPRs included in the study were issued before October 2001. 
9
 Results are similar when we define the proxy as the market-to-book value of assets (Bamber and Cheon 
1998; Gaver and Gaver 1993). 
10
 As in prior literature (Bamber and Cheon 1998), we also vary the measure by scaling market-to-book 
value by assets. Results do not change. 
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Table 1: Sample descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Spanish sample       
Variable N Mean Median Skewness Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
GROWTH 112 0.00 0.00 4.60 0.00 -0.04 0.07 
GROWTH_FU 119 0.00 0.00 7.66 0.00 0.00 0.06 
PERFORMANCE 122 0.72 1.00 -1.04 0.44 0.00 1.00 
SIZE 120 5.97 6.06 0.26 2.01 2.02 11.24 
OPERA_PROF 120 230743.61 27124.00 4.65 737616.34 -698809.00 4924000.00 
LEVERAGE 119 25.70 25.89 0.41 17.05 0.00 78.82 
INDUSTRY 123 2.50 3.00 -0.04 1.32 1.00 4.00 
        
Panel B: UK sample       
GROWTH 109 0.00 0.00 5.63 0.01 -0.01 0.12 
GROWTH_FU 121 0.00 0.00 8.83 0.01 -0.00 0.17 
PERFORMANCE 119 0.57 1.00 -0.32 0.49 0.00 1.00 
SIZE 122 6.16 6.14 0.20 2.35 -0.27 12.43 
OPERA_PROF 120 495494.33 36750.00 4.46 1445233.94 -244391.00 10406820.00 
LEVERAGE 119 21.80 19.63 1.23 17.33 0.00 92.42 
INDUSTRY 123 2.48 3.00 -0.01 1.32 1.00 4.00 
        
Panel C: Full sample       
GROWTH 240 0.00 0.00 6.27 0.01 -0.04 25341460.00 
GROWTH_FU 240 0.00 0.00 10.98 0.01 -0..00 0.17 
PERFORMANCE 241 0.65 1.00 -0.065 0.47 0.00 1.00 
SIZE 242 6.07 6.09 0.24 2.18 -0.27 0.12 
OPERA_PROF 240 363118.97 31104.50 5.14 1152596.26 -698809.00 10406820.00 
LEVERAGE 238 23.75 23.50 0.80 17.26 0.00 92.42 
INDUSTRY 246 2.49 3.00 -0.02 1.32 1.00 4.00 
N=246 companies. Number of cases varied depending on availability of data in Datastream on each variable.  
GROWTH is market to book ratio measured as market value scaled by total equity in year t-1. GROWTH_FU is market to book ratio measured as market 
value scaled by total equity in year t. PERFORMANCE is 1 (Good news companies) when net profit for the current year exceeds the firm’s net for the prior 
year and 0 (Bad news companies) when net profit for the current year does not exceed the net profit for the prior year. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the 
company market capitalisation. OPERA_PROF is operating profit measured by Worldscope item WC01250 and it  represents the difference between sales 
and total operating expenses. LEVERAGE is the leverage ratio measured as total debt to total asset Worldscope item WC08236. INDUSTRY is a categorical 
variable with the following levels: 1=consumer and capital intermediate goods, 2=construction, 3=financial services. 
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Table 2: Bivariate Pearson correlations for independent variables  
 1  2 3  4  5 6 7 
1 GROWTH             
2 GROWTH_FU 0.07 **           
3 COUNTRY 0.08 ** 0.06          
4 PERFORMANCE -0.08  -0.03 * -0.15 *       
5 SIZE 0.26 ** -0.00 * 0.04  0.11       
6 OPERA_PROF 0.04  -0.02 0.11  0.13 * 0.58 **    
7 LEVERAGE -0.15 * -0.02 -0.11  0.01  0.10 0.10   
8 INDUSTRY 0.19 ** -0.01 -0.00  0.07  0.39 ** 0.18 ** 0.19 ** 
**Significant at <0.01; *Significant at 0.05 
N=246 companies. Number of cases varied depending on availability of data in Datastream on each variable.  
GROWTH is market to book ratio measured as market value scaled by total equity in year t -1. GROWTH_FU is market to book ratio 
measured as market value scaled by total equity in year t . COUNTRY is 1 for UK and 0 for Spain. PERFORMANCE is 1 (Good news 
companies) when net profit for the current year exceeds the firm’s net for the prior year and 0 (Bad news companies) when net  profit for the 
current year does not exceed the net profit  for the prior year. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the company market capitalisation. 
OPERA_PROF is operating profit measured by Worldscope item WC01250 and it represents the difference between sales and total operating 
expenses. LEVERAGE is the leverage ratio measured as total debt to total asset Worldscope item WC08236. INDUSTRY is a categorical 
variable with the following levels: 1=consumer and capital intermediate goods, 2=construction, 3=financial services. 
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Table 3: Results for the logistic regression of ARPR disclosure  
Model 1 log(p/1-p)=0 + 1 GROWTH + 2 GROWTH_FU + 3 COUNTRY +4 PERFORMANCE + 5 SIZE + 6 OPERA_PROF + 7 
LEVERAGE + 8 INDUSTRY 
 
Variables Hyp. (exp. sig.)       Model 1  Model 1a   
  Coef. 
(p-val) 
 Coef. 
(p-val) 
  
INTERCEPT  -2.37 
(0.00) 
 -1.76 
(0.00) 
  
GROWTH H1 (-) -36.89 
(0.01) 
 -30.47 
(0.03) 
  
GROWTH_FU  116.9 
(0.22) 
 123.1 
(0.18) 
  
COUNTRY  1.13 
(0.00) 
 1.10 
(0.00) 
  
PERFORMANCE  0.40 
      (0.04) 
 0.31 
(0.10) 
  
SIZE  0.57 
(0.00) 
 0.50 
(0.00) 
  
OPERA_PROF  -7.47 
(0.00) 
 -6.84 
(0.00) 
  
LEVERAGE  -0.00 
(0.70) 
 -0.00 
(0.79) 
  
INDUSTRY  YES  NO   
       
1
Model 2 
 
66.73 
(0.00) 
 63.24 
(0.00) 
  
Concordant percent  82.6  81.8   
2
H-L test  5.31 
NS 
 5.35 
NS 
  
Sample size  216  216   
1
The model 2 is the difference between -2 log likelihood for the model with only a constant and likelihood for the current model. The 
model 2 measures the overall statistical significance of the model. The model tests the probability t hat the company will issue an ARPR. 
The dependent variable is 1 if the company issues an ARPR and 0 otherwise. The tests are modelled for the lower level of the independent 
variables. 
2
The Hosmer-Lemeshow test of goodness-of-fit tests the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the observed and predicted 
values of the response variable. In this case, the test is not significant (NS) and therefore we fail to reject the null hypo thesis that there is no 
difference between the observed and the predicted values. Thus, it  can be concluded that the model is a good-fitting one. 
GROWTH is market to book ratio measured as market value scaled by total equity in year t -1. GROWTH_FU is market to book ratio 
measured as market value scaled by total equity in year t . COUNTRY is 1 for UK and 0 for Spain. PERFORMANCE is 1 (Good news 
companies) when net profit for the current year exceeds the firm’s net for the prior year and 0 (Bad news companies) when net  profit for the 
current year does not exceed the net profit  for the prior year. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the company market capitalisation. 
OPERA_PROF is operating profit  measured by Worldscope item WC01250 and it  represents the difference between sales and total 
operating expenses. LEVERAGE is the leverage ratio measured as total debt to total asset Worldscope item WC08236. INDUSTRY is a 
categorical variable with the following levels: 1=consumer and capital intermediate goods, 2=construction, 3=financial services. 
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Table 4: Results for the analysis of timing of ARPRs disclosure  
 
Model 2 Log LAG = 0 + 1 COUNTRY + 2 IRD +3PERFORMANCE + 4 SIZE + 5 INDUSTRY   
Model 2a Log LAG = 0 + 1 COUNTRY + 2 IRD +3PERFORMANCE + 4 IRD*COUNTRY+ 5 SIZE + 6 INDUSTRY 
Model 2b Log LAG=0 + 1 COUNTRY + 2 IRD +3PERFORMANCE + 4 IRD*COUNTRY + 
5 PERFORMANCE*COUNTRY + 6 SIZE + 7INDUSTRY 
Variables Hyp. (exp. sig.) Model 2 Model 2a Model 2b   
  Coef. 
Odds ratio 
(p-val) 
Coef. 
Odds ratio 
(p-val) 
Coef. 
Odds ratio 
(p-val) 
  
COUNTRY H2 (+) -0.59 
1.06 
(0.00) 
-1.09 
0.33 
(0.00) 
-0.58 
0.55 
(0.01) 
  
IRD H3 (+) -0.41 
0.66 
(0.02) 
-0.91 
0.40 
(0.00) 
-1.22 
0.29 
(0.00) 
  
PERFORMANCE H4 (+) 0.06 
1.06 
         (0.72) 
0.13 
1.50 
(0.44) 
0.86 
2.38 
(0.01) 
  
IRD*COUNTRY  H3a (+)   0.74 
 2.11  
(0.03) 
1.06 
2.91 
(0.00) 
  
PERFORMANCE
*COUNTRY 
H4a (-)   -1.05 
0.34 
(0.00) 
  
SIZE  0.14 
1.06 
(0.00) 
0.15 
1.17 
(0.00)  
 
0.17 
1.18 
(0.00) 
  
INDUSTRY       
IND1
 
 -0.19 
0.82 
(0.31) 
-0.13 
0.87 
(0.52) 
0.13 
0.87 
(0.50) 
  
IND2  0.09 
1.10 
(0.73) 
0.21 
0.90 
(0.47) 
0.26 
1.30 
(0.37) 
  
IND3  -0.10 
0.90 
(0.73) 
-0.10 
2.11 
(0.72) 
0.14 
0.86 
(0.62) 
  
       
-2 Log L
  
1382.60 1382.60 1382.60   
LR  34.80 
(0.00) 
39.01 
(0.00) 
46.58 
(0.00) 
  
Sample size  246 246 246   
The Cox Proportional Hazard model tests the association between LAG (number of days between the year-end and the date of the ARPR) 
and the independent variables. 
The dependent variable is the log of hazard (log LAG). Negative coefficients indicate a longer lag period.  
COUNTRY is 1 for UK and 0 for Spain. IRD is 1 when the company has an investor relations department or investor relations officer, and 0 
otherwise. PERFORMANCE is 1 (Good news companies) when net profit for the current year exceeds the firm’s net for the prior year and 0 
(Bad news companies) when net profit for the current year does not exceed the net profit for the prior year. SIZE is the natural logarithm of 
the company market capitalisation. INDUSTRY is a categorical variable with the following levels: IND1=consumer and capital intermediate 
goods, IND2=construction, IND3=financial services 
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Table 5: Sensitivity checks of timing of ARPRs disclosure  
Limited dependent variables (TOBIT) 
 
 Model 2 Log LAG = 0 + 1 COUNTRY + 2 IRD +3PERFORMANCE + 4 SIZE + 5 INDUSTRY   
Model 2a Log LAG = 0 + 1 COUNTRY + 2 IRD +3PERFORMANCE + 4 IRD*COUNTRY+ 5 SIZE + 6 INDUSTRY 
Model 2b Log LAG=0 + 1 COUNTRY + 2 IRD +3PERFORMANCE + 4 IRD*COUNTRY + 
5 PERFORMANCE*COUNTRY + 6 SIZE + 7INDUSTRY 
Variables Hyp. (exp. sig.) Model 2 Model 2a Model 2b   
  Coef. 
(p-val) 
Coef. 
(p-val) 
Coef. 
(p-val) 
  
INTERCEPT  63.81 
(0.00) 
59.69 
(0.00) 
66.26 
(0.00) 
  
COUNTRY H2 (-) 13.94 
(0.00) 
25.48 
(0.00) 
17.60 
(0.00) 
  
IRD H3 (-) 8.95 
(0.00) 
19.56 
(0.00) 
20.36 
(0.00) 
  
PERFORMANCE H4 (-) -0.26 
       (0.92) 
-1.09 
(0.71) 
-9.00 
(0.08) 
  
       
IRD*COUNTRY  H3a (-)  -17.16 
(0.00) 
-17.80 
(0.00) 
  
PERFORMANCE
*COUNTRY 
H4a (-)   11.38 
(0.07) 
  
SIGMA  17.60 
(0.00) 
17.22 
(0.00) 
17.06 
(0.00) 
  
SIZE  -2.95 
(0.00) 
-3.21 
(0.00) 
-3.37 
(0.00) 
  
INDUSTRY       
IND1
 
 1.80 
(0.59) 
0.39 
(0.90) 
0.24 
(0.94) 
  
IND2  -0.56 
(0.91) 
-1.95 
(0.69) 
-0.78 
(0.87) 
  
IND3  2.64 
(0.61) 
2.42 
(0.63) 
2.76 
(0.58) 
  
       
LL
  
-710.34 -706.48 -704.90   
Sample size  246 246 246   
The model tests the association between LAG (number of days between the year-end and the date of the ARPR) and the independent 
variables. 
COUNTRY is 1 for UK and 0 for Spain. IRD is 1 when the company has an investor relations department or investor relations officer, and 0 
otherwise. PERFORMANCE is 1 (Good news companies) when net profit for the current year exceeds the firm’s net for the prior year and 0 
(Bad news companies) when net profit for the current year does not exceed the net profit for the prior year. SIZE is the natural logarithm of 
the company market capitalisation. IMR is the Inverse Mill s´ ratio obtained from a first  stage regression where we model the decision to 
issue an ARPR. INDUSTRY is a categorical variable with the following levels: IND1=consumer and capital intermediate goods, 
IND2=construction, IND3=financial services 
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Table 6: Sensitivity checks of timing of ARPRs disclosure  
Control for self-selection problems 
 
Model 2 Log LAG = 0 + 1 COUNTRY + 2 IRD +3PERFORMANCE + 4 SIZE + 5 INDUSTRY   
Model 2a Log LAG = 0 + 1 COUNTRY + 2 IRD +3PERFORMANCE + 4 IRD*COUNTRY+ 5 SIZE + 6 INDUSTRY 
Model 2b Log LAG=0 + 1 COUNTRY + 2 IRD +3PERFORMANCE + 4 IRD*COUNTRY + 
5 PERFORMANCE*COUNTRY + 6 SIZE + 7INDUSTRY  
Variables Hyp. (exp. sig.) Model 2 Model 2a Model 2b   
  Coef. 
(p-val) 
Coef. 
(p-val) 
Coef. 
(p-val) 
  
INTERCEPT  44.73 
(0.00) 
42.89 
(0.00) 
51.48 
(0.00) 
  
COUNTRY H2 (-) 22.57 
(0.00) 
34.01 
(0.00) 
24.70 
(0.01) 
  
IRD H3 (-) 10.05 
(0.00) 
21.76 
(0.00) 
23.03 
(0.00) 
  
PERFORMANCE H4 (-) 0.68 
        (0.83) 
-0.74 
(0.82) 
-9.55 
(0.12) 
  
       
IRD*COUNTRY  H3a (-)  -19.41 
(0.00) 
-20.42 
(0.00) 
  
PERFORMANCE
*COUNTRY 
H4a (+)   12.39 
(0.08) 
  
IMR  21.94 
(0.23) 
18.48 
(0.24) 
16.80 
(0.25) 
  
SIZE  -2.36 
(0.00) 
-3.19 
(0.00) 
-3.14 
(0.00) 
  
INDUSTRY       
IND1
 
 1.27 
(0.83) 
1.27 
(0.82) 
2.41 
(0.67) 
  
IND2  3.50 
(0.55) 
5.03 
(0.38) 
5.50 
(0.33) 
  
IND3  -1.28 
(0.73) 
0.74 
(0.84) 
1.02 
(0.78) 
  
       
Adj. R
2  
0.27 0.32 0.33   
F value  7.39 7.91 7.53   
Sample size  246 246 246   
The model tests the association between LAG (number of days between the year-end and the date of the ARPR) and the independent 
variables. 
COUNTRY is 1 for UK and 0 for Spain. IRD is 1 when the company has an investor relations department or investor relations officer, and 0 
otherwise. PERFORMANCE is 1 (Good news companies) when net profit for the current year exceeds the firm’s net for the prior year and 0 
(Bad news companies) when net profit for the current year does not exceed the net profit for the prior year. SIZE is the natural logarithm of 
the company market capitalisation. IMR is the Inverse Mill s´ ratio obtained from a first  stage regression where we model the decision to 
issue an ARPR. INDUSTRY is a categorical variable with the following levels: IND1=consumer and capital intermediate goods, 
IND2=construction, IND3=financial services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
